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Introduction
This research aims to identify the possibilities and limitations in realizing a 
feminist agenda through the state. To this end, we conduct a critical policy 
frame analysis through feminist perspectives on work and family policy that 
emerged as a means to deal with the demographic problems in South Korea 
since the mid-2000s, and discuss its implications for gender equality.
The work and family issue has historically been of great interest within 
the field of Korean feminist movements. Since the 1980s, feminists have 
consistently demanded the abolition of forced retirement upon marriage, the 
extension of the maternity leave period and the social sharing of its costs, the 
provision of paid parental leave and family care leave, the introduction of a 
policy for men’s participation in childcare, and an increase in public childcare 
facilities. Such demands from feminist movements aimed to secure women’s 
economic independence, gender-equal employment rights, and motherhood 
rights. In campaigning for these rights, Korean feminists sought to 
fundamentally transform unequal gender relations based on the gender 
division of labor (Kim and Ryu 2008). However, these demands from 
feminist movements were not widely accepted, and policies introduced 
following these demands were marginalized within national policy. 
Work and family policy in Korea was considered increasingly important 
within national policy only after it became part of the ‘national project’ (Kim 
2009, p. 27) in response to demographic problems of low fertility and 
population aging in the mid-2000s. Not only was the public expenditure on 
childcare increased significantly1 alongside the expansion of the childcare 
leave period and its generous coverage and benefits, but also the paternity 
leave and family care leave that feminist movements had long demanded 
were introduced without strong oppositions from the mainstream political 
actors. The phrase ‘work and family balance’ that had been used limitedly in 
feminist movements became increasingly common in public speeches from 
top-level decision-makers, such as the president and other ministers. Finally, 
‘work and family policy’ was officially entitled as a major policy created 
through an amendment to the Act on Equal Employment that changed into 
the Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation. 
The mainstreaming of the feminist agenda contains both potential and 
1 The child care budget was increased from 145 billion won in 2000 to 600 billion won in 2005, 
and in 2014 it reached 5.3 trillion won (Kim et al. 2015, pp. 22-3).
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danger in terms of transformation of gender relations. On the one hand, it 
can provide opportunities to more effectively address issues of gender 
inequality by encouraging actors with more financial, organizational, and 
human resources to lead the agenda, when compared with the potential of 
feminists existing outside the state. On the other hand, such mainstreaming 
of an apparently feminist policy agenda where political agents act with 
interests other than gender equality could weaken core feminist politics and 
limit the introduction of any reformative policy. It also involves the danger of 
contributing to the reproduction of the unequal norms and values of the 
mainstream. It is expected that the political ideologies of the mainstreaming 
policy actors and the opportunities of feminist movements to access the 
institutional policies bring about differences to the extent of possibilities and 
limitations. However, despite the differences in political actors, the dominant 
norms and values that the state has historically pursued at length also operate 
as an important factor for gender equality. 
In this context, we examine differences and similarities of the work and 
family policy frames between the Roh Moo-hyun government and the Lee 
Myung-bak government, the two politically opposing governments after the 
emergence of work and family policy as a way to deal with the social 
problems of low fertility and aging population. There is an interesting 
contrast between the two governments in relation to the goal of this research. 
The Roh Moo-hyun administration, the first government to raise the work 
and family issue as a national agenda, was feminist friendly and socially 
progressive (Kim and Kim 2014). Having won the election with the support 
of those who were involved in the Korea’s democratization movements in 
1980s, President Roh appointed individuals who had historically been 
involved in the feminist movement as the heads of the Ministry of Gender 
Equality. Cooperating with feminist groups, the Roh government realized a 
progressive feminist agenda, including the abolition of the family-head 
system2 and the enactment of the ACT ON THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL 
TRAFFIC AND PROTECTION, ETC. OF VICTIMS (Kim 2009; Kim and 
Kim 2014). The subsequent Lee Myung-bak government was business-
friendly and market-oriented. It was backed by right-wing conservative 
groups, which opposed the democratization movement groups. In its initial 
years, the Lee government attempted to abolish the Ministry of Gender 
2 The family head-system refers to the patrilineal Korean family system that prior to the mid-
2000s bureaucratically, legally and socially recognized only the eldest male within a given family unit 
as responsible for the family group. 
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Equality as part of its effort to create ‘a small but efficient practical national 
government’ but following a strong opposition from feminist groups ended 
only reducing it. However, in policy-making, the Lee government excluded 
feminist groups and banded together with conservative women’s groups 
(Shin 2011). 
There are two main research concerns. The first is to analyze the 
differences of the work and family policy frames propagated by the two 
politically different governments, and investigate the implications of these 
frames for gender relations. The other is to identify the attributes of the ‘deep 
meaning system’ (Bacchi 2009, p. 24) that was consistently rooted across both 
governments, and critically reveal the limitations of the work and family 
policy as a way to deal with the national agenda of low fertility and 
population aging, following feminist perspectives. 
This study therefore attempts to address the following questions: In 
relation to the first concern of the study, how does the work and family policy 
frame of the apparently feminist-friendly progressive government differ from 
that of the conservative government that excluded feminist groups? What 
general assumptions about gender division of labor underlie the work and 
family policy, and what implications do these have for the changes of gender 
relations? How could the differences between the two governments be 
explained? In relation to the second concern, what are the common 
dominant discourses affecting the work and family policy frames of the two 
governments, and how do these prevent the production of policies that could 
bring about a radical change of gender relations in South Korea?
This paper consists of six sections. Having discussed the outline of the 
study above in the introduction, section two discusses the theoretical 
frameworks of gender perspectives in work and family policy and the critical 
policy frame analysis. The third outlines the data and research methods, 
before the fourth moves on to demonstrate the results of the frame analysis 
on the public speeches made by the high-ranking decision makers from the 
two governments. The fifth section is the discussion of the results, followed 
by the implications for the feminist movement that are derived from the 
research. 
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Theoretical Framework
Work and Family Policy and Gender 
Work and family balance is a multidimensional agenda within which various 
policy targets and objectives intersect. The various targets include women 
with double burden of work and family that feminist movements have long 
paid attention to, as well as diverse group interests such as male workers, 
children, the disabled, old people, and sick people (Wisensale 2001). In a 
democratic society, it is also within this field that fierce political debates 
amongst businesses, unions, political parties, and feminist movements occur, 
addressed to the adoption and development of the relevant policy to suit their 
demands. The objectives and instruments for a work and family policy have 
diverse focal points that intersect with other policies including those 
concerning family, labor market, elderly, childcare, and population. They 
change depending on the national macro-societal environments, historical 
paths of policy development, political opportunity structures, and political 
power structure of those involved in the policy processes. 
However, work and family balance is fundamentally a core concept of 
gender policy. Feminists have considered work and family balance as an issue 
of gendered social relations, and have continuously criticized the problems of 
gender inequality in the family and the labor market. From the industrial 
period onward, work and family have become spheres separated in relation to 
the gendered division between paid labor and unpaid labor, and this divide 
has worked as the main mechanism for the unequal distribution of societal 
roles and resources. The social order has become organized by the 
assumption that women will fulfill the care needs that every human being 
necessarily encounters throughout their life-course. This operates to directly 
restrict women’s position within the paid labor market and adversely affect 
women’s economic independence and freedom. Women’s economic 
dependency on men has weakened their bargaining power within the 
household, while men’s dependency on women’s caring has privileged them 
in this power imbalance (Tronto 2013). 
As women’s participation in the labor market has increased, the conflict 
surrounding the balanced responsibilities of work and family also has grown. 
However, the experiences of such conflict are not gender symmetric. Women 
experience more conflicts in respect of work and family balance than men, 
and they are much more vulnerable economically due to having to undertake 
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unstable employment such as part time jobs, as a result of this imbalance. 
This is because the increased participation of women in the labor market and 
their consequent contribution to the family income do not correspond to 
men assuming a greater share of responsibility for caring for children and 
family members. Women are now more burdened with family care and paid 
work due to the delay in encouraging male members of the family to equally 
assume the burden of care work (Lewis 2009).
Lewis conceptualizes work and family policies since the late 1990s at the 
EU level as an instrumentalist, and employment-driven approach, which only 
aim to promote women’s participation in the market. In line with the wider 
welfare state restructuring in the EU, a work and family policy was integrated 
into the employment-led social policy, targeting economic growth and 
market competitiveness (Lewis 2009). The feminist potential that work and 
family policies originally had, namely the concern to share family 
responsibilities between women and men, have become marginalized within 
the issue of facilitating and encouraging women’s employment, as part of the 
European Employment Strategy (Lewis 2009). This implies that the goal of 
gender equality through dismantling gender division of labor is replaced by a 
market-oriented objective of market competitiveness and job creation 
(Stratigaki 2004). European feminist researchers criticize work and family 
policy for its de-gendered and de-politicized characteristics, arguing that 
work and family policies that target the increase of women’s employment 
through flexible working environments do not challenge the gender division 
of labor and stereotypes perpetuated within the existing family structure 
(Stratigaki 2004; Jalušič 2009; Lewis 2009). Work and family policies are 
considered as only women’s issues, while little attention is paid to men’s role 
and responsibility within the family. Furthermore, Lewis argues that attention 
is paid to care-giving in policy decisions only insofar as it affects achievement 
of employment goals; and that policies that merely raise women’s 
employment rates devalue caring despite it being a universal human need and 
desire, and make women’s position within the labor market more vulnerable 
(Lewis 2009).
Critical Policy Frame Analysis
This study is based on a discursive politics approach, which emerged in 
relation to criticism of the limitations of the rational approaches based on 
positivism that viewed policy problems as existing objectively outside policy 
processes, within which the best collective decisions could be possibly 
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achieved (Hastings 1998; Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998; Bacchi 1999; 
Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009; Zittoun 2009; Shim, Park, and Wilding 
2015). Traditional approaches to policy have tended to focus on what the 
most rational choices are amongst various policy alternatives in a specific 
policy goal, or how to solve the conflicts that arise in relation to diverse 
interests and values, through a rational political process (Bacchi 1999; Shim 
et al. 2015). However, in taking for granted the policy problems as given 
rather than constructed, such approaches have limitations in not being able 
to consider the influence of discursive and political power relations in the 
policy-making processes. In contrast, the discursive politics approach is 
particularly suited to exploring the way power works in the policy-making 
process and leads us to reflect the normative implications for gendered power 
relations in society (Lombardo et al. 2009). As Lombardo and others have 
indicated, the meaning of gender equality as a political and policy concept 
changes dynamically through connecting to various political and policy 
objectives ‘in its journeys through times and places’ (Lombardo et al. 2009, p. 
1). 
The discursive politics approach concentrates on representation of 
policy problems and its normative effects. We view a policy as a product of 
political processes constructed by political actors who have access to unequal 
resources, as opposed to being the result of a rational decision making 
process. The problems that any given policy is attempting to address cannot 
exist as an objective unchangeable matter. Policy issues and interests 
consistently alter along with the intentional or unintentional framings made 
by the main agents involved in the policy processes, and are affected by the 
dominant discourses that serve to produce and constrain available truth at 
specific points in time and place (Lombardo et al. 2009). Discourse, as a 
system of thought that confines frames and ways of viewing policy issues 
(Bacchi 2009) influences the construction of the policy’s meaning, and the 
languages that people with power use themselves have normative and 
material impacts.    
Critical policy frame analysis as a discursive politics approach was 
theorized by European gender equality policy researchers (Verloo 2005: 
Verloo and Lombardo 2007; Bustelo and Verloo 2006; Lombardo et. al. 2009). 
Generally, the notion of a frame refers to an interpretive scheme that people 
use to make sense of the world (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998). This kind 
of interpretive frame can serve ‘to organize experience and guide action’ 
(Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614), cognitively order events and relate them to 
one another (Ferree and Merrill 2000, p. 456), and as an “interpretative 
626 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 45 No. 3, December 2016
package” that has internal structure organizing core ideas (Ferree 2003, p. 
308). If a frame is a ‘snapshot’, framing is the process of producing meaning 
through interactions amongst participants (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614; 
Oliver and Johnston 2000, p. 42; Ferree and Merrill 2000, p. 456). As actors 
involved in the policy process constantly change and negotiate intentionally 
or unintentionally, a policy frame can be considered as consistently changing 
and not fixed.   
Policy frames, by choosing and emphasizing particular elements from 
the diverse aspects of reality, construct reality and produce the meanings of 
the policy. Identical concepts or languages can, for instance, change their 
meanings depending on the principles of organizing and arranging them. 
Policy frames as the products of discursive politics are the outcomes of the 
cognitive struggles surrounding meanings constructed by diverse actors, but 
the framing process does not always assume the actors’ intentions (Bacchi 
2009; Verloo and Lombardo 2007). Frames can also reflect deep cultural 
meaning or deep-seated presuppositions, and the important purpose of a 
policy frame analysis is to reveal the normative assumptions and meanings 
implicit in the construction of the policy. Disclosing unconscious 
assumptions underlying policy frames is therefore equivalent to revealing the 
ways that dominant discourses work, exposing the voices and ideas that 
dominate policy meanings, and the voices and ideas that are excluded and 
marginalized (Verloo 2005, p. 18; Verloo and Lombardo 2007, p. 34). Such 
approach to policy allows us to critically reflect on the effects of unconscious 
dominant discourses that actors do not realize, and by thinking outside of 
dominant discourses provides a starting point to imagine the reformative 
alternatives that could ultimately change iniquitous power relations. 
Data and Methodology
Data
This study analyzes the public speeches3 made by the high-ranking decision 
makers such as presidents, prime ministers, and ministers and vice ministers 
from 2003 to 2012. The text of speeches was collected from the official 
3 Policy frame analysis normally uses public documents such as white papers, but this research 
used public speeches because the official documents created by the Korean government tend to 
focus on outcomes and thus do not contain sufficient information about policy ideas. 
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government websites; Policy Briefings designed to promote government 
policy that is run by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism,4 the 
website of the Prime Minister,5 and the website of the Ministry of Gender 
Equality,6 which produces the largest amount of discourses regarding the 
work and family balance policies7. Within each website, we searched the key 
words including ‘women’, ‘women’s economic activity’, ‘women’s employment’, 
‘work and family balance’, ‘work and family reconciliation’, ‘childcare’, ‘caring’, 
‘motherhood protection,’ ‘family friendly’, and ‘family-friendly business’. 
Initially we collected 119 public speeches, 41 from the Roh government 
(2003-2007) and 78 from the Lee government (2008-2012). As we went 
through the materials, we selected the public speeches that contained 
contents directly related to work and family balance issues. Finally 97 
announcements have been included for the final analysis, consisting of 38 
from the Roh government and 59 from the Lee government (See Appendix 1 
for specific information about the speeches).8
Methodology 
There are many methodologies9 to detect frames in text data (Matthes and 
Kohring 2008; David, Atun, Fille, and Monterola 2011; Shim et al. 2015), but 
no dominant methodology exists so far. This study employs a semantic 
network analysis, which is based on the theories and methodologies of social 
network analysis. Semantic network analysis is advantageous because of its 
ability to combine quantitative and qualitative methods for identifying policy 
frames. On the one hand, it objectively identifies the central concepts in a 
4 http://www.korea.kr/main.do date of searching 2015.8.18.
5 http://pmo.go.kr/pmo/prime/prime03_03.jsp date of searching 2015.8.19.
6 http://www.mogef.go.kr/korea/view/intro/intro02_01_03.jsp date of searching 2015.8.20.
7 Following the Government Organization Act, there have been multiple changes of the name of 
the ministry responsible for gender equality issues including the Ministry of Gender Equality and 
the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. The current official title is the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family. In this paper, we use the Ministry of Gender Equality.   
8 The smaller number of announcements made by the Roh government compared with those of 
the Lee government is due to the duration difference where each government focuses on work and 
family balance as policy agenda. Discussions of work and family policy began within the Roh 
government’s early to mid period. The Lee government, on the other hand, emphasized work and 
family policy as the major issue of gender equality policy from the very beginning.
9 Matthes and Kohring (2008) divide frame analysis into 5 different approaches: a hermeneutic 
approach, a linguistic approach, a manual holistic approach, a computer-assisted approach, and a 
deductive approach.
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given network using quantitative measurements, which helps to overcome 
the issues of subjectivity that qualitative frame analysis is often criticized for. 
On the other hand, it is also based on qualitative frame analysis in searching 
for hidden meanings through the process of human interpretation of 
connected concepts, which complements the weak points of quantitative 
analysis, that is, its over-dependency on specific words and terms while 
neglecting contexts (Shim et al. 2015). For this reason, since early 2010 within 
the Korean academic community, studies utilizing semantic network analysis 
for policy frame analysis have increased in diverse policy fields including 
spectrum policy (Kim, Choi, and Lee 2010), nuclear energy policy (Shim 
2011; Shim et al. 2015), and economic policy (Cha and Kweon 2015). The 
method and methodology of this study are detailed as follows. 
As the first step, we selected meaningful paragraphs from each of the 
given announcements and coded words with similar meanings through 
content analysis. 123 paragraphs were selected from the Roh government’s 
speeches and 195 paragraphs were selected from the Lee government’s. 
Researchers repeatedly read the speeches and discussed what would count as 
words with similar meanings for the coding process. 17 categories were taken 
from the Roh government’s speeches and 22 categories from the Lee 
government’s. For example, from the selected paragraphs, words such as ‘low 
fertility’, ‘low birth rates’, ‘low fertility/aging’, and ‘aging society and low 
fertility’ are categorized as ‘low fertility and aging’. National goals related to 
the economy such as ‘national competitiveness’, ‘potential economic growth 
rate’, ‘new economic growth strategy’, and ‘economic growth’ are combined as 
the category ‘economic growth/national competitiveness’. When necessary, 
we chose sentences or phrases rather than words to categorize. For example, 
phrases including ‘childbirth and caring are the women and family’s burden’, 
and ‘parents’ childcare burden’ are categorized as ‘childcare burden for 
women and family’. We use the software package Atlas.ti 7.5 for the content 
analysis on the texts. 
As the second step, we created a symmetric co-occurrence matrix that 
shows frequencies of all the pairs of concepts within one paragraph. In 
semantic network analysis, a concept, which is a combination of one or more 
words, acts as the node in social network analysis. The relationship between 
two concepts is equivalent to the edge or tie in social network analysis. If two 
or more concepts appear simultaneously within one sentence or paragraph, 
these concepts are considered connected (Shim 2011; Vogel 2012; Kim 2015; 
Shim et al. 2015). By applying such social network analysis, we could analyze 
central concepts and the meanings created through connected concepts in 
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the decision makers’ speeches on work and family balance. To reveal the core 
concepts within the relational structures of various concepts, we conducted 
the network coreness and centrality analysis. Next, to identify latent semantic 
structure underlying the relational patterns amongst central concepts, we 
conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis, before creating a two-dimensional 
map to visualize the distances between the concepts. For richer 
interpretations of the meaning structures of the connected concepts, we cited 
the source data that included typically repeating relations between concepts. 
As the quantitative estimations of network analysis are not able to provide 
interpretations of meanings constructed through relations amongst concepts, 
it is essential to include researchers’ qualitative interpretations in semantic 
network analysis (Drieger 2013). 
For the analysis of core/periphery and centrality, and the visualization of 
the semantic network map, we used the software package UCINET 6. We 
utilized degree centrality and eigenvector centrality10 as centrality measures. 
SPSS package was used to conduct the cluster analysis and the 
multidimensional scale analysis. 
Results
Work and Family Policy Frame of the Roh Government
The 8 concepts that are most frequently mentioned and centrally positioned 
in the semantic network of the Roh government’s work and family policy are: 
women’s economic participation, childcare provision, low fertility and aging, 
utilization of women’s human resources, work and family balance, economic 
growth/national competitiveness, gender equality, and advanced country. 
Along with concepts that reflect the feminists’ demands such as women’s 
participation in the economic activity, childcare provision, and gender 
equality, there coexist the instrumentalist concepts related to the national 
crisis and goals, such as utilization of women’s human resources, low fertility 
and aging, economic growth/national competitiveness, and advanced 
10 Degree centrality is measured as the numbers of nodes directly connected, and the more other 
nodes that a given node is connected to, the higher the centrality measure becomes. Eigenvector 
centrality is calculated through not only the numbers of connected nodes but also reflecting the 
connectivity with the influential nodes. Higher degree centrality is interpreted as having higher local 
power, whereas higher eigenvector centrality is considered as to have more influential within the 
entire network.
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country. Apart from childcare provision, other concepts and policy 
instruments for work and family policy that have implications for the 
transformation of gender division within family, such as men’s childcare 
TABLE 1 
Occurrence and Centrality of the Concepts within the Roh 
Government
 Concepts (abbreviations) Occurrence Coreness*
Centrality**
Degree Eigenvector
Women’s economic participation 
(WEP)
47 1 6.313 63.626
Childcare provision (CP) 48 1 5.375 51.920
Low fertility/aging (LFA) 35 1 5.250 51.541
Utilization of women’s human 
resources (UWHR)
28 1 4.313 47.689
Work-family balance (WFB) 27 1 4.813 45.246
Economic growth/National 
competitiveness (EGNC)
25 1 3.500 37.809
Gender equality (GEE) 22 1 3.625 35.855
Advanced country (AC) 21 1 3.563 35.144
Caring burden of women and family 
(CBWF)
18 0 2.125 23.954
National development (ND) 12 0 1.688 20.089
Quality of life (QL) 14 0 2.375 17.979
Men’s childcare responsibility 
(MCR)
13 0 2.125 17.039
Creating women’s jobs (CWJ) 11 0 1.250 14.210
Family-friendly business (FFB) 10 0 1.813 13.724
Business productivity/
Competitiveness (BPC)
7 0 1.688 13.291
Parental leave (PL) 6 0 1.375 12.311
Investment of the future (IF) 5 0 0.438 4.308
* 0=periphery, 1=core
** normalized measures
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responsibility, parental leave, and family-friendly businesses, are located in 
the periphery (see table 1). 
The semantic network map11 that visualizes the relational patterns 
amongst concepts shows women’s economic participation, the most 
influential concept of all, is strongly connected to the instrumentalist 
concepts of low fertility and aging, economic growth and national 
competitiveness, utilization of women’s human resources, and childcare 
provision as a policy instrument (see appendix 2). 
<Figure 1> is the Multi-Dimensional Scale (MDS) map that visualizes 
the results of hierarchical cluster analysis on the two dimensional space. 
Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis indicate that 17 concepts are 
classified into three clusters. 
The first cluster consists of 5 concepts, including national development, 
utilization of women’s human resources, economic growth/national 
11 The size of the node in the networks is positively proportional to the values of eigenvectors, 
while the strength of the tie is positively proportional to the frequencies of co-occurrences amongst 
concepts. The larger the value of node is, the more influential it is within the semantic networks, and 
the thicker the tie is, the more intimately connected the two concepts are.
* Stress=0.0664  RSQ=0.9828
Fig. 1.-MDS Mapping of 17 concepts under the Roh Government
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competitiveness, creating women’s jobs, and women’s economic participation. 
The second cluster includes 7 concepts, including advanced country, low 
fertility/aging, work and family balance, business productivity/
competitiveness, quality of life, men’s childcare responsibility, and family-
friendly business. The third cluster contains 5 concepts, including childcare 
provision, investment of the future, caring burden of women and family, 
parental leave, and gender equality.
The MDS results show the moderate level of Kruskal’s stress value 
(0.0664), indicating a moderate level of the goodness-of-fit, while the 
proportion of variance of the disparities accounted for by the MDS procedure 
shows a high level of 98% (RSQ=0.983). In the dispersions of concepts 
located in the two-dimensional space, the X-axis can be interpreted as who 
are considered responsible for the work and family balance issues, whereas 
Y-axis can be interpreted as whose interests are reflected in the work and 
family balance issues. In the X-axis, the more it goes left from the center (0), 
the more the concepts tend to emphasize state responsibility or intervention 
in work and family balance issue, while the more it goes to right, the more the 
concepts stress corporate responsibility in it. On the Y-axis, the greater the 
positive number is, the more the concepts emphasize state/national interests, 
whereas the greater the negative number is, the more the concepts reflect 
women’s interests. 
Overall, highly influential concepts tend to be mainly located in the first 
and the second quadrant, reflecting ‘national interests’ rather than ‘women’s 
interests’, while a few of the concepts are located in the third quadrant, 
indicating national support for the ‘women’s interests’. There are also concepts 
in the fourth quadrant in which women’s interests and corporate 
responsibility crisscross, but these are not the influential concepts within the 
entire network. 
In terms of characteristics of each cluster, the first cluster located in the 
second quadrant can be defined as ‘instrumentalist utilization of women’. 
Looking at the relationships amongst central concepts that have bigger effects 
within the entire network, women’s economic participation is closely 
connected to the utilization of women’s human resources and economic 
growth/national competitiveness. Women’s economic participation is 
considered as ‘the key engine of growth for the low fertility and aging 
society’12 by a top-level decision-maker. The low economic participation rate 
for female college graduates is used to provide evidence of the inadequate use 
12 The Commemoration Speech of the Prime Minister at the 12th Women’s Week. July 4, 2007.
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of the nation’s ‘highly educated women’s human resources’ to the extent that 
is ‘worrisome in terms of the national competitiveness in the future’.13 
Therefore, the utilization of women’s human resources and the expansion of 
women’s economic participation are considered as key tasks to aid economic 
growth and strengthening of national competitiveness. The president as well 
as the prime ministers and ministers/vice-ministers all emphasize that 
utilizing women’s human resources and economic participation are 
mandatory to achieve the goal of ‘per capital national income of 20,000 USD’ 
and raise ‘the national competitiveness’14 set by the Roh government.
The second cluster widely located in first and fourth quadrant can be 
called ‘work and family balance as a way to solve low fertility/aging 
population’. The concepts related to corporate responsibility have been 
included in this cluster, but most of them are marginalized to the degree that 
they have little impact on meaning construction within the entire network. 
The central meanings produced in this cluster mainly come from the 
combined relationships amongst work and family balance, low fertility/aging, 
and advanced country. That the concept of low fertility and aging and that of 
advanced country are related can be seen through phrases such as ‘we need to 
urgently solve the low fertility issue… to become an advanced economy’,15 a 
task for us ‘on the verge of threshold of becoming an advanced country to 
‘urgently solve’,16 ‘The lowest fertility rate amongst OECD member countries’, 
‘Women’s employment rate and fertility rate are positively associated as seen 
in the other OECD countries’, and ‘those countries who had earlier similarly 
experienced low fertility problems’. In these statements, the issues of low 
fertility and aging society are put forward as problems in need of urgent 
address as they offer obstructive factors to South Korea becoming an 
advanced country. Furthermore, the assumption is that the problems that 
Korea now encounters can be overcome by learning from the past 
experiences of other advanced countries that earlier went through low 
fertility rate crises similarly. 
Finally, the third cluster that contains concepts directly related to the 
national support for childcare and women’s interests can be titled ‘childcare 
13 The Words of encouragement of the Minister of Education at the Spring Scholarly Meetings of 
the Korean Federation of Women Professors. June 3rd, 2005.
14 The Commemoration Speech of the Minister of Gender Equality at the 9th Women’s Week. July, 
2, 2004.
15 2006 The Presidential Budget Address at the National Assembly. October 12, 2005.
16 The Commemoration Speech of the Minister of Gender Equality at the 12th Women’s Week. 
July 4, 2007.
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support for gender equality’ given the connections among highly influential 
concepts. Childcare provision is mentioned to ‘promote women’s rights’, as a 
policy to achieve ‘genuine gender equality’, and the issues of low fertility are 
seen to be resolvable through ‘women’s status improvement’, and ‘family, 
workplace, and social environments that are more gender equal’.
Work and Family Policy Frame of the Lee Government
The nine concepts that are the most centrally positioned in the semantic 
network of the Lee government’s work and family policy are: women’s 
economic participation, work and family balance, career discontinuity, family 
friendly businesses, economic growth/national competitiveness, low fertility/
aging, flexible working arrangements, the utilization of the women’s human 
resources, and advanced country. 
The Lee government is similar to the Roh government in that women’s 
economic participation is the most influential concept, but is different in 
terms of the policy instruments favored to achieve this. The mentioning of 
childcare provision is visibly less frequent, and it becomes marginalized in 
the network together with gender equality. Instead career discontinuity, 
family friendly businesses, and flexible working arrangements are moved to 
the center. The focus of work and family policy remains women’s economic 
participation. However, now the primary concern lies in supporting the 
prevention of career discontinuity, women’s reemployment, the creation of 
family friendly business environments, and an increase in part-time 
employment and flexible working arrangements. The labor market problems 
including employment discrimination against women and long working 
hours, which work against women’s economic participation, are newly 
mentioned but located in the periphery in the network along with other 
policy instruments such as men’s childcare responsibility and parental leave 
(see table 2). 
Despite these differences, instrumentalist concepts such as low fertility 
and aging, economic growth/national competitiveness, advanced country, 
and the utilization of women’s human resources, which were centralized 
within the Roh government’s policy, remain as core interests under the Lee 
government.
The semantic network map represents that women’s economic 
participation continues to be closely connected to the state’s primary goals of 
economic growth/national competitiveness, the response to crisis of low 
fertility and aging, and becoming an advanced country. However, corporate 
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TABLE 2 
Occurrence and Centrality of the Concepts within the Lee 
Government
Concepts (Abbreviations) Occurrence Coreness*
Centrality**
Degree Eigenvector
Women’s economic participation 
(WEP)
83 1 8.619 73.100
Work-family Balance (WFB) 48 1 5.476 53.435
Career discontinuity (CD) 30 1 3.619 41.369
Family friendly Businesses (FFB) 50 1 4.429 39.250
Economic growth/National 
competitiveness (EGNC)
43 1 3.333 39.028
Low Fertility/Aging (LFA) 33 1 3.524 38.214
Flexible working arrangements 
(FWA)
33 1 3.238 35.362
Utilization of women’s Human 
Resources (UWHR)
39 1 3.190 34.001
Advanced country (AC) 31 1 3.143 32.095
Caring burden of women and family 
(CBWF)
20 0 2.190 23.847
Gender equality (GEE) 24 0 2.095 19.961
Creating women’s jobs (CWJ) 11 0 1.095 14.486
Business productivity/
Competitiveness (BPC)
15 0 1.476 13.001
Quality of life (QL) 12 0 1.381 12.233
Employment discrimination against 
women (EDAW)
12 0 1.048 12.018
Long working hours (LWH) 10 0 1.048 11.621
National development (ND) 10 0 1.000 11.084
Childcare provision (CP) 9 0 0.810 9.248
Women’s self-realization (WSR) 6 0 0.619 7.385
Men’s childcare responsibility (MCR) 7 0 0.762 6.499
Parental leaves (PL) 5 0 0.571 5.246
Investment for the future (IF) 6 0 0.667 4.611
* 0=periphery, 1=core
** normalized measures
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related concepts such as family-friendly business and flexible working hours 
that were marginalized in the Roh government, as well as the concept of 
career discontinuity, emerged as a new policy area, are closely related to 
women’s economic participation (see appendix 3). 
Hierarchical cluster analysis reveals two major clusters out of 22 
concepts (see figure 2). The first cluster comprises of 13 concepts, including 
economic growth/national competitiveness, utilization of women’s human 
resources, low fertility and aging, advanced country, career discontinuity, 
women’s economic participation, and so on. The second cluster comprises 9 
concepts including family-friendly business, work and family balance, 
flexible working arrangements, long working hours, business productivity/
competitiveness, and so on. 
The MDS results show the moderate level of Kruskal’s stress value 
(0.0966), indicating a moderate level of the goodness-of-fit, while the 
proportion of variance of the disparities accounted for by the MDS procedure 
shows a high level of 99% (RSQ=0.985). The two-dimensional space can be 
interpreted similarly to that of the Roh government. Again, the X-axis can be 
interpreted as subjects of responsibility, whilst the Y-axis indicates subjects of 
interests in the work and family balance issue. Overall, multiple concepts are 
concentrated on the second quadrant, meaning ‘national responsibility and 
* Stress=0.0966  RSQ=0.9850
Fig. 2.-MDS Mapping of 22 concepts under the Lee Government
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interests’. The rest of them are loosely located in the first and fourth quadrant 
of corporate responsibility, but the core concepts are positioned in the 
crisscross of women’s interests and corporate responsibility. There is only the 
concept of women’s economic participation in the third quadrant, indicating 
‘national support for the women’s interests’. 
The first cluster located in the second and third quadrant is almost 
analogous to the first cluster of the Roh government titled ‘instrumentalist 
utilization of women’. Women continue to be considered ‘the new engine of 
growth in the face of low fertility and aging society’17 by a top-level decision-
maker. In this regard, it is stressed that ‘We need to expand women’s 
economic participation more than anything in order to overcome economic 
crisis and establish foundations for sustainable growth, as ‘the experiences of 
the advanced countries’ well demonstrate’. The concepts of ‘sustainable 
growth’ and ‘green growth’ form the Lee government’s primary political 
rhetoric on economic development, equivalent to Roh’s ‘per capita national 
income of 20,000 USD’. The women’s contribution to the economic growth 
was stressed to the degree that ‘The facilitation of the women’s economic 
participation toward sustainable growth’ was featured as the theme of the 
Women’s Week in 2009.  
Following the relationship amongst the most influential concepts, the 
second cluster, located in the first and fourth quadrant, can be titled 
‘corporate responsibility for work and family balance’. The emphasis point in 
the work and family policy is moved to flexible working arrangements and 
family friendly businesses. Creating family friendly working environments 
and culture to prevent women from leaving the workplace due to childbirth 
and caring, and supporting women’s reemployment through various flexible 
working arrangements such as part-time, telecommuting, and flexible hours 
become the core instruments of the work and family policy. The 
responsibility for the issues of work and family policy now lies in 
corporations and the labor market, shifted from the emphasis within the Roh 
administration on the role of the state’s social responsibility to provide 
childcare. The Minister of Employment and Labor in this context is tasked 
with persuading businesses to ‘create many jobs that are compatible with 
work and family balance, such as part time and telecommuting, rather than 
favoring women who can work full time’,18 and the Minister of Gender 
17 The Commemoration Speech of the Minister of Gender Equality at the 13th Women’s Week. 
July 3rd, 2008.
18 The Speech of the Minister of Employment and Labor at the Gender Equal Employment Week. 
April 1st, 2009.
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Equality in its many agreement ceremonies with corporations that are the 
family friendly businesses constantly states that it would help ‘businesses to 
create a better work culture in order to be better workplaces for women’.19
Discussion 
Differences in Policy frames and Gender Norms between two governments
The most distinguishable difference in the work and family policy frames 
between the two governments lies in the subjects of changes and emphasis 
points of policy instruments in work and family balance. Childcare provision 
under the Roh government was the centrally important policy instrument. 
Childcare was considered to be a public service area where the state and 
society should share the responsibility, as opposed to remaining the 
responsibility of the individual family.20 In contrast, under the Lee 
government the policy was used to encourage a changing of the working and 
employment environments through the creation of family friendly business 
and the expansion of the flexible working arrangements.21 The responsibility 
for the issues of work and family policy now lies with corporations and the 
labor market, shifted from the emphasis within the Roh administration on 
the role of the state’s social responsibility to provide childcare. The second 
difference is in the centrality of gender equality. Under the Roh government, 
gender equality was not the most influential concept in its policy frame, but 
was centrally located in the semantic network, being the crucial foundation 
for introducing childcare provision. In contrast, under the Lee government, 
gender equality became marginalized, and was shifted to the subcategories 
under other concepts related to national goals such as economic growth/
national competitiveness and advanced country. 
19 The Congratulatory Message of the Minister of Gender Equality at the Agreement Ceremony of 
Women Friendly Businesses with SK Telecom. February 25th, 2009.
20 Although the childcare policy under the Roh government was criticized as making insufficient 
effort to encourage public responsibility for caring due to a high dependence on a private supply of 
services (Song 2014), there is no dispute that it promoted the de-familialization of caring.
21 The subsequent Lee government continuously expanded childcare support, but its meaning 
was now changed. Childcare policy did not represent the means to the de-familialization of childcare 
but was instead a cash support policy that was designed to lessen the financial burden of the 
household (Song 2014). The introduction of a childcare allowance for families who did not use state 
provided childcare facilities demonstrates the changed characteristics of the Lee administration’s 
policy on child care.
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Such differences between the two governments contain gaps in their 
normative implications on gender relations. If we view the Roh government’s 
policy to have normative implications for women to transform into workers 
through a de-familialization of childcare, which had long been considered the 
primary responsibility of women, that of the Lee government implies the 
women’s normative role now as both children’s care-givers, and as workers to 
be enabled through flexible employment practices. Whilst the work and 
family policy under the Roh government is characterized as an 
instrumentalist utilization of women to achieve mainstream political goals, it 
also implies gender norms that call for changes in women’s traditional 
responsibility through an expansion of childcare services. Meanwhile, under 
the Lee government, the strong connectivity among work and family balance 
and flexible working arrangements assumes the norm that women are 
responsible as both care-givers for family members and workers in the labor 
market. Although ‘Purple Jobs’ in which workers can work by the hours and 
use their hours flexibly were promoted as the jobs that enable work and 
family balance for ‘workers’, the gender neutral term,22 the work and family 
policy has now become a policy that encourages ‘women to take care of both 
work and family’.23 The prior implicitly endorses ‘the universal breadwinner 
family model’ and the latter the ‘1.5 breadwinner family model’.
How can we explain the differences between the two governments? We 
argue that the following three factors brought about the differences in the 
meaning construction of work and family balance policy: the ideologies 
regarding social policy, the characteristics of the organizations and actors that 
were involved in constructing the meaning of the policy, and their degrees of 
coalition with the feminist movement. 
Firstly, in terms of the ideologies regarding social policy, the Roh 
government pursued a policy line conceived as a ‘virtuous circle of growth 
and welfare’ to expand state welfare. This particularly served to improve a 
social service policy that previously lagged behind the social insurance 
system and public assistance (Seong 2014, pp. 90-8). The expansion of 
childcare policy that accompanied a radical increase in the policy budget was 
part of these efforts. On the other hand, having taken power with its so-called 
‘747 promise’24 highlighted as a policy directive, the Lee government was a 
22 The Congratulatory Message of the Minister of Gender Equality at the Next Generation 
Women Leader Conference. November 25th, 2009. 
23 The Congratulatory Message of the President at the 50th anniversary of Korean National 
Council of Women. November 3rd, 2009. 
24 This means 7% annual economic growth, 40,000 USD income per capita within 10 years, and 
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growth-oriented, business friendly government. Due to the path-dependency 
of the policy as continuing from the previous government, it was not able to 
shrink established welfare policy (Seong 2014, pp. 103-10), but it accelerated 
new labor market policy that was pro-business. This aimed to achieve job 
creation and a surge in the employment rate through flexible working hours 
and the expansion of temporary work positions. Women’s economic 
participation was part of these employment policy efforts, and, as such, was 
only used as a tool to attain employment targets through the expansion of the 
part-time labor and the activation of a previously inactive sector of the 
population within the workforce.
Secondly, the differences between the two governments could be 
explained by the role allotted to the Ministry of Gender Equality, as the 
principal actor producing work and family discourses, and in its status 
amongst other national bureaucratic bodies. Under the Roh government, 
childcare policy was transferred from the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare to the Ministry of Gender Equality,25 on the basis of the 
argument that approaching childcare issues from a gender perspective was 
necessary to avoid simply maintaining childcare as the responsibility of 
women. The fact that the Ministers appointed by Roh all had experience in 
the feminist movement also explains how the concept of gender equality 
became central within the administration’s work and family policy. On the 
other hand, the Lee government transferred childcare policy back to the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, and reduced the scale and functions of the 
Ministry of Gender Equality. The new core tasks that were assigned to the 
Ministry of Gender Equality included promoting a family friendly business 
culture and supporting women whose careers had been disrupted due to 
their family responsibilities. This resulted in the issue of childcare work 
becoming marginalized, and the issues of family friendly business practice 
and career discontinuity becoming significantly more important. Flexible 
working arrangements, however, cannot be explained fully within the context 
of this change of responsibility for the Ministry of Gender Equality. Flexible 
working arrangements that were linked to a change of working hours was 
emphasized as a policy instrument within the Ministry of Gender Equality, 
although this had fallen under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor. This implies that the work and family policy of the 
entrance to the Group of Seven advanced economies.  
25 It was also part of the strategic choice to enhance the rather weak status and power of the 
Ministry of Gender Equality within the government organizations.
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Ministry of Gender Equality was subordinated to the employment policy of 
the Ministry of Employment and Labor which focused on the improvement 
of employment rate through flexible working arrangements, which the Lee 
government stressed the most.   
Thirdly, the differences between the two governments’ emphasis points 
in policy are rooted in the extent of the coalition each government had with 
the feminist movement. The Roh government maintained a close and 
cooperative relationship with feminist movement groups as policy partners. 
<The coalition meetings for the low fertility and population aging> organized 
to create a consensus on the problems of low fertility and aging population 
had co-chairs that included those from feminist groups, along with 
governments, unions, and corporations. As a result, the vocabulary used by 
Korean feminists to demand ‘the enforcing of the social responsibility of 
childbirth and caring’ are reflected in the decision makers’ speeches. Decision 
makers recognize childcare provision as a tool to de-familialization of 
childcare, as shown by their remarks, ‘childbirth and caring are no longer the 
responsibility of women or family’26 and ‘we are now moving forward from 
the past where childbirth and caring were considered individual 
responsibilities’.27 In contrast, the Lee government excluded feminist 
movements from its policy process, and cooperated with conservative 
women’s groups. Conservative women’s groups, not being able to work as an 
axis of the policy making process, were mobilized to promote its government 
policy through campaigns such as ‘G-Korea, the World Women Draw’ that 
promoted the green growth movement and green life and culture. Their work 
was limited to providing uncritical support for the government rather than 
acting as a strategic joint partner to resolve gender inequality issues. 
‘Instrumentalist Women’s Employment’ Frame and The Discourse of 
Developmentalism 
It should be noted that in spite of these clear differences, many concepts 
related to work and family policy in both governments had commonalities in 
that they implied ‘instrumentalist utilization of women’. In other words, 
concepts that are related to women’s interests were relatively less influential in 
the network or were marginalized. In both cases, women’s economic 
26 The Commemoration Speech of the Minister of Gender Equality at the Low Birth-rate 
Problems Seminar. November 26, 2004.
27 The Commemoration Speech of the Prime Minister at the Korea-Norway Work and Family 
Balance Seminar. May 9th, 2007.
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participation was the central concept and was linked intimately with 
instrumentalist concepts, such as low fertility and aging, economic growth 
and national competitiveness, and the utilization of women’s human 
resources as a means to become an advanced country. This suggests that in 
the ten years following the introduction of a state strategy to address the issue 
of low fertility and aging, work and family policy was trapped in the 
‘instrumentalist women’s employment’ frame. 
The term ‘Instrumentalist’ captures the idea that the characteristics of 
work and family policy are constructed mainly around the nation’s 
instrumental goals and incidents of national crisis rather than political/social 
values of gender equality. This seems to be similar to the Lewis’ criticism on 
Europe’s work and family policies since the late 1990s discussed above. Yet, 
Korea’s ‘instrumentalist’ attributes are significantly different from those of 
Europe. The criticism of work and family policy suggested by Lewis was in 
relation to Europe’s changing of the policy goals and instruments which 
deviated from the previous policies that explicitly targeted gender equality 
and equal gender division of labor, and moved towards the merging of such 
policies into the employment policy in the midst of social welfare reductions. 
In Korea, there has never been a case where policy supporting women’s 
economic participation has set its goals explicitly as strengthening women’s 
economic capacity or more equal gender division of labor. Rather, Korea’s 
instrumentalist attributes of work and family policy were rooted in its history 
as a developing country that pursued a path of strong state-led 
industrialization. 
We suggest that the instrumentalist women’s employment frame reflects 
the dominant discourses of developmentalism that originated from Korea’s 
developmental state experience in the 1960s–1970s. While the developmental 
state has now declined, developmentalism as a discourse (Kim 2014, p. 169) 
arguably remained to work as the values and norms that govern national 
goals as well as the rationales behind national policies. Kim defines 
developmentalism as ‘the attitudes and discourses that prioritize a society’s 
economic development through industrialization and economic growth over 
any other values’ (Kim 2014, p. 168), and argues that the goal of becoming an 
‘advanced country’ has consistently been the national target for every 
government and the underlying blueprint for Korean society. 
There are two traces of developmentalism that can be seen within both 
of the two governments’ meaning construction of work and family policy. 
First, the results indicate that the two governments prioritized national 
economic growth over the value of gender equality itself. The concepts 
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related to national economic growth, such as economic development/
national competitiveness and the need to become an advanced country, were 
centrally placed in the semantic network within both governments. The Roh 
government’s ‘per capita national income of 20,000 USD’ and the Lee 
government’s ‘sustainable growth and development’, and ‘green growth’ all 
demonstrate the unquestioned value attached to national economic growth, 
and the strong assumption that an ‘advanced country’, meaning a ‘developed 
state’ (Kim 2014, p. 172), should be the intended destiny of the state. 
Becoming an ‘advanced country’ through economic growth is the ultimate 
national goal that could be achieved only after overcoming the current crisis 
of low fertility and aging population. In this respect, the expansion of 
women’s economic participation constituted an indispensable means to 
conquer the current crisis of low fertility, aging population, and economic 
downturn, and entering into the realm of ‘advanced countries’. 
The second element of evidence can be found in the centrality of 
women’s human resources as essential for economic growth and national 
competitiveness. ‘The development and utilization of women’s human 
resources’ is the concept that has continued since the advent of gender 
equality policy in the mid-1980s. It was this language that informed the 
creation of the <Women’s Development Basic Plans>,28 the first national plan 
of this sort, produced in 1985, designed to enable South Korea to join the 
UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. The term ‘women’s development’ demonstrates how the relationship 
between the state and women has been consistently connected through 
developmentalism discourses. The purpose of the <Framework Act on 
Women’s Development> which had continued to provide the foundations for 
gender equality policy since the mid-1990s, was to ‘promote women’s 
development’. Its basic idea was ‘to have both men and women participate in 
the development of the State and society and share responsibility through the 
promotion of gender equality’. The official objective of the gender equality 
policy was to have women ‘participate in the development of the State and 
society’ rather than attempt a redistribution of the unequal balance in power 
and resources between men and women. This phrase ‘participate in the 
28 The first of five objectives of the <Women’s Development Basic Plans> included “the maximum 
utilization of the women’s human resources in every social area”, and the second was to strive for “the 
utmost efforts to develop the women’s ability to make infrastructures for the gender equality and 
women’s higher status. 2 out of 3 strategies for the plans were “the utilization of the women’s human 
resources” and “women’s ability development”(Korean Women’s Development Institute 1985, pp. 
9-10).
644 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 45 No. 3, December 2016
development of the State and society’ was removed from the official 
objectives, through which Women’s Development Basic Act was replaced by 
the new Framework Act on Gender Equality in 2014. However, the language 
continues to inform the defining language of the relationship between the 
state and women in actual policy practice.   
The Effects of Developmentalist Discourses 
We argue that the developmentalism has worked as the dominant discourse, 
which limits policy development from enabling the equal division of labor 
between paid and unpaid work and changing the gendered social hierarchy. 
This was done by prioritizing instrumentalist values such as economic 
growth and development, and by excluding the thought that gender equality 
should itself become a value of the policy. The impacts of these discourses are 
listed as follows. 
First, as mentioned earlier, under the developmentalist discourse, 
women’s economic participation is not regarded as an issue of unequal 
distribution of economic resources by gender. Women’s economic 
participation is dealt with as a tool to enable the national goal of becoming an 
advanced country and as an additional benefit of economic growth, but not 
in itself in relation to the stand-alone value of gender equality. The issue of 
women’s fragile position within the labor market and the gender pay gap are 
marginalized, and never the core objective of the women’s employment 
policy. Under the Lee government, the negative impacts of the 
instrumentalist values of women’s economic participation were further 
exacerbated. Within the limited perspective of the Lee administration, 
women’s economic participation was seen as an instrument to boost the 
employment rate, and women were considered as a low-income workforce 
flexibly utilizable depending on the needs of the capital.  
The second impact is to prevent ‘caring’, something crucially important 
in the issue of gender inequality, from being considered through a social 
justice perspective. Citizens are worth policy attention only when they are 
able to contribute to economic growth. It is argued that the national policy 
focused on the value of women as motors for new growth, and social support 
for children was considered as an investment in the national future. 
Conversely, the elderly and the disabled who are assumed not to contribute to 
economic growth and national development are regarded as ‘burdens’ for the 
society, or objects of charity. Socialized care work outside the family became 
devalued as low-status jobs. For example, elderly long-term care work was 
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initially designed as low-income jobs for middle-to-old aged women. The 
national budget for childcare has expanded considerably since the Roh 
government, but childcare service providers remain subject to long working 
hours and poor income conditions. These unsatisfactory care environments 
fail to attract and encourage appropriately qualified caregivers. Instead the 
caregivers are often unqualified, and as such the citizen’s right to quality care 
is denied.  
Lastly, a policy concern dealing with an unequal gender division of the 
care work within the family became marginalized. A change in unequal 
gender division of labor would only be obtainable when the role of women’s 
paid work and the role of men’s caring responsibility are balanced. Top-level 
decision makers from both the governments highlighted women’s excessively 
assigned caring responsibility as a barrier for solving the problems of low 
fertility and aging populations, but no-one seriously problematized men’s lack 
of responsibility as care-givers and their household labor participation in 
general. The equal sharing of caring and household chores was never a focal 
point within policy. Even in the Roh government in which the societal 
sharing of the childcare responsibility was a central theme in the work and 
family policy, the issue of men’s caring for children and housework 
participation drew little attention from the mainstream policy actors. Under 
the conservative government, in relation to the premise that women would 
continue to be responsible for caring for children and family members while 
flexibly working, it is not surprising that the governmental interest in the 
expansion of men’s caring responsibility became even more marginalized.
Conclusion
Taken together, the above discussion shows that the Korean developmental 
state has fundamental limitations to realizing a feminist agenda. The more 
feminist-friendly and progressive Roh government, compared with the 
conservative Lee government, had more potential to change the role of 
women as paid-workers. However, the study shows that the dominant 
discourse of developmentalism still worked to impede the development of 
policy that would lead to fundamental changes in gender relations. Despite 
the differences in political ideology and the extent of alliance with feminist 
groups, the dominant developmentalism discourse as the deep meaning 
system, which the two governments had in common, functioned to prohibit 
the work and family balance agenda from becoming a radical and 
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reformative means to change unequal gender relations. 
In conclusion, we argue that a critical policy change contributing to the 
transformation of gender relations will only be possible through feminist 
ideas outside the state. Feminist research and movements should aim to 
recover the political aspects of work and family policy agenda through 
thinking and working outside of the frames dominated and composed by the 
mainstream policy actors, and attempt to influence new policy directions. 
Going beyond the developmentalism discourses is the first departure point 
for any feminist movements that might attempt to create an alternative work 
and family policy frame. Work and family balance as the feminist agenda 
should be replaced by the redistribution frame for caring as citizens’ rights. 
Feminists should reconstruct a work and family balance agenda and 
transform the discourse by considering questions like, how can the care 
needs that every citizen experiences throughout their life course be secured 
as a citizens’ right? What are the ways to encourage men to engage in unpaid 
carework? And what are the impacts of gender hierarchy within the paid 
labor market on caring practices within the family?  
(Submitted: August 17, 2016; Revised: September 26, 2016; Accepted: October 17, 2016)
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Appendix 1. Characteristics of the Public Announcements in 
the Analysis
Categories Types Roh government
Lee 
government
Speakers President 7(18.4) 11(18.6)
Prime Ministers 8(21.1) 6(10.2)
Ministers and Vice-ministers 23(55.3) 42(72.2)
Events Overall National Speeches (Speeches at the 
National Assembly, New Year’s Speech etc.)
4(10.5) 7(11.2)
Ministry of Gender Equality-led events 
(Women’s week events etc.)
11(28.9) 26(37.8)
Other events organized by the government 1(2.6) 4(6.1)
Women’s groups events 10(26.3) 12(22.4)
Policy forums 10(26.3) 10(20.4)
Others 2(5.2) 0(0.0)
Total 38(100.0) 59(100.0)
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Appendix 2. Semantic Network Map under the Roh Government
Appendix 3. Semantic Network Map under the Lee Government
